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1. Introduction 
Promises have normative force. The fact that I have promised that I will do something, all things 
being equal, gives rise to a reason to do it.  Why, though, do promises give rise to reasons? I will 1
consider a number of  possibilities which don’t work (§1.1), then I will sketch a more plausible 
explanation (§2)—that it is constitutive of  the practice of  promising that promise-breaking im-
plies liability to blame and that we desire to avoid such liability. This effects a reduction of  the 
normativity of  promising to conventionalism about liability together with a minimal form of  instru-
mental normativity.  I call such a view quasi-conventionalist—it makes essential reference to prom2 -
issory conventions, but the normative upshot doesn’t arise from these. It instead arises from the 
normativity of  desire-based reasons aimed at properties grounded in our conventions. 
 Quasi-conventionalism can be extended to account for nearly all normativity—excepting 
the normativity of  desire-based reasons—but I will not do so here. My goal in this paper is just 
to develop a reasonable quasi-conventionalist view of  promising. This is independently interest-
ing as well as suggestive of  a general reduction of  normativity to conventions, desire-based rea-
sons, and minimal instrumental normativity. It is possible to accept my view of  promises without 
accepting my general take on normativity. Likewise, it is possible to accept my view of  promising 
while replacing desire-based reasons with value-based reasons or rational obligations to have cer-
tain desires. 
  
 Many thanks to Berit Brogaard, Agnes Callard, Eli Chudnoff, Bradford Cokelet, Catharine Diehl, Erhan Demir* -
cioğlu, Cansu Keskin, Benjamin Kiesewetter, Barry Maguire, Daniel Nolan, Mary Robertson, Karl Schafer, Sarah 
Stroud, Michael Slote, Amie Thomasson, Lucas Thorpe, Lars Vinx, Ken Westphal, and Bill Wringe for helpful 
comments. Thanks especially to Simon Gaus for useful comments on an early draft and Barry Maguire for forcing 
me to write my view up. Audiences at the Humboldt University, Boğaziçi University, Middle East Technical Univer-
sity, and especially the Arizona Workshop in Normative Ethics also provided very useful feedback. 
 I only discuss reasons, not obligations. The relationship between the two exceeds the scope of  this paper. ‘All things 1
being equal’ here captures the catch-all category of  promises which are unhappy because of  coercion, contextual 
cancelation of  illocutionary force (such as promising while acting), and the like. 
 Readers may notice a more-than-passing similarity to Hart’s views on legal normativity as I proceed. One crucial 2
difference between our views is our explanation of  reasons to obey a practice when sanctions will not be imposed. 
Hart uses the notion of  an internal point of  view—a point of  view in which we view the rules of  a legal system to be 
binding—to explain why we have reasons to obey the law. I find this mysterious at best; hence my preferred strategy 
of  using desire-based reasons and instrumental normativity to explain why we take the rules of  a practice to be reason 
providing. I take instrumental reason and thus instrumental normativity to be understood for the purposes of  this 
short paper. See (Hubin, 2001) for a defense of  the innocuousness of  instrumental reasons for humean accounts. 
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 Convention-involving views of  promissory reasons have three main advantages. First, as 
Kolodny and Wallace (2003) argue, convention-involving views are the most plausible analyses 
of  promising which avoid explanatory circularity. Second, conventional views are naturalistic in 
that they reduce mysterious-seeming promissory reasons to something non-mysterious such as a 
conventional practice or expectation. Such views are to be preferred if  they can be given. Finally, 
it seems almost a Moorean fact that promissory conventions and, resultingly, promissory reasons 
differ from context to context. Ordnung muss sein, but not everywhere.  And some promissory 3
conventions demand that there are few exculpating conditions for promise-breaking. A robust 
theory of  the reasons arising from these domains should accommodate this; doing so is difficult 
on a non-convention-involving view. I will thus restrict my attention in what follows to views 
which make use of  conventions in explaining promissory reasons. 
 In addition to satisfying our main desideratum—that acts of  promising produce rea-
sons—and the above additional desiderata, a theory of  promising ought to explain a number of  
other features of  promissory normativity. First, a theory of  promises should explain the particu-
larity of  promissory reason (§1.2)—that promises give rise to a reason for me to keep my promise 
to you. Second, it should be able to explain the diversity of  reasons—-moral, prudential, political, 
etc—to keep our promises (§1.3). Third, it should be able to provide a plausible story about cas-
es of  conflicting and immoral promises (§1.3). The view I will defend has an easy time with 
these. Promissory reasons arise from my desire to keep my promise to you; promissory reasons are 
distinct from moral, political, and prudential reasons, so we have many different reasons to keep 
our promises; and, finally, quasi-conventionalism predicts significant (though hopefully out-
weighed!) promissory reason to keep our evil promises or keep both promises in the case of  un-
expected conflict but allows that there are, say, moral reasons to break the lesser promise. 
 My argument in favor of  quasi-conventionalism is abductive; quasi-conventionalism can 
account for cases other conventionalist explanations of  promissory reasons cannot, it is natural-
istic, it can explain the particularity of  promissory reasons, it is flexible enough to explain both 
types of  diversity of  reasons to keep our promises, and it can deal with cases of  evil and con-
flicting promises. The putative difficulties with such a view are either overstated or can be as-
suaged (§2.1-2.2). All in all, it is a tidy and compelling picture of  our promissory reasons. 
 And, importantly, one which significantly better in capturing the sense in which promises 
directly give rise to reasons. I am not claiming that the reasons which arise directly from the act 
of  promising  are always overriding, though I suspect they often are. I am not claiming that we 
always ought, all things considered, keep our promises, though I suspect often we must. I only 
 “Ordnung muss sein” is true if  and only if  there must be order. 3
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claim that, all things being equal, when I have promised to do something, then I have a reason, 
however, small, to do it. This seems a rather central feature of  the practice of  promising. And 
promising is a central case of  normativity. If  promises do not provide reasons in all normal non-
coerced reasonably well-informed cases, then little is left of  the distinctiveness of  promising as a 
central normative notion. Nevertheless, extant conventionalist views of  promising fail even this 
minimal requirement. 
1.1 Difficulties for other Conventionalist Views 
Consider the following views:  4
(1) The practice of  promising is a socially useful or valuable practice and breaking a promise 
contributes to its breakdown.                                                         (Cartoon Hume 1972)  5
(2)  There is an expectation that the promiser will keep their promise and defeating this ex-
pectation is a harmful or disvaluable thing.                                              (Scanlon 1990) 
(3) Promises cede normative authority to the recipient of  the promise. Breaking promises 
defies this authority and their interest in our keeping our promises.             (Owens 2012)                                                           
(4) We have an obligation to follow those rules the widespread of  acceptance of  which 
would maximize good consequences. Promising is such a set of  rules.        (Hooker 2011) 
On each of  these views we explain the normative force of  promising either by the existence or 
goodness of  a conventional practice (1, 2-4) or by general features of  the act of  promising 
which can be viewed as conventional (2).  The primary trouble with (1-4) is that they don’t ex6 -
plain why we have reasons to keep our promises in many cases. Consider: 
  Deathbed Promise: I promise you that I will water your plant after you die. It’s 
  an ugly  plant; not something the world will be poorer without. Moreover, it's a 
  pain to  water the plant. I need to find the water can, fill it, then sprinkle water on 
 I am putting aside natural law accounts and ‘promises are normative when we should do what we’ve promised 4
anyways’ accounts. These are grotesquely implausible on their face. I am also putting aside Rawls’s account of  prom-
issory wrongs that trades off  of  a general moral requirement against free-riding. One reason, mentioned below, is 
that Rawls’s picture has difficulty accounting for the particularity of  promissory reasons. Another is that Rawls’s 
picture is famously vulnerable to a circularity complaint (Robins 1984).
 Although this very cartoonish picture of  Hume is sufficient for my purposes, there is a more accurate interpreta5 -
tion under which we develop moral reasons to keep our promises (i.e. a settled disposition to disapprove of  prom-
ise-breaking from a common point of  view) as a way of  maintaining socially useful promissory practices (Cohon 
2006). The resulting view is not miles away from mine, but discussion would be distracting from my present purpos-
es. One notable difference is that, on my account, the reason generator is not a sentiment aimed at promise-breaking, 
but rather a sentiment aimed at a conventionally specified consequence of  promise breaking, blame-liability. I hope to 
address the differences between Hume’s view and my own in further work. 
 Scanlon himself  does not take promissory conventions to be essential, but the most plausible development of  his 6
view makes essential use of  promissory conventions in order to to explain the reasonableness of  forming an expec-
tation that someone will keep their promises (Kolodny and Wallace 2003).  
!3
  the plant twice a week. No one knows about my promise. I do not water  
  the plant. It withers and dies. I don’t feel guilty or suffer psychological trauma. 
There is no plausibility to the idea that violating the deathbed promise contributes to the break-
down of  the valuable institution of  promising or impinges on my future ability to make promis-
es (1) or that it harms anyone (2).  Clearly utility will be better served by violating some deathbed 7
promises (4). Yet there is still normative force associated with my promising. I can regard myself  
as having done something I should not have and I would be right to so regard myself; my lazi-
ness is not exculpatory. So if  (1), (2), or (4) are at best partial explanations of  the normative 
force of  promising. (3) is not threatened by our above case, but consider: 
  No Expectation Promise: I, an untrustworthy friend, ask you for a small  
  amount of  money, promising that I will repay you in a week. You have no  
  expectation that I will do so, but you have plenty of  money and feel bad for  
  me. You lend me the money. I do not repay you.  8
In No Expectation Promise, there is again no sense in which you are harmed in the way Scanlon 
needs—his account of  harm trades on the expectation that a promise would be fulfilled (2). 
Likewise, it’s hard to see how such violations could degrade the social institution of  promising 
(1). Just like the fact that we occasionally lie in circumstances where it is expected has no effect 
on the fact that communication proceeds on the expectation of  truthfulness, that we occasional-
ly break our promises has no effect on the fact that promising proceeds on the expectation of  
typical commitment. With respect to (4), note that utility maximizing promissory practices will 
plausibly allow us to sometimes break promises when no one depends on their fulfillment.  It 9
would be strange if  the optimific set of  rules fails to have an exception clause for this easily rec-
  A reviewer suggests that violating our deathbed promises may inculcate promise-breaking dispositions. In order 7
for this to suffice to get a reason, we need that such dispositions in me will undermine the practice and that I will 
actually develop such a disposition from even a single act of  deathbed promise-breaking. This combination is im-
plausible; even if  I would develop a disposition to occasionally break my promises, it’s unlikely that my actions have 
sufficient impact on the behaviors of  others that our promissory conventions will break down. Consider, for exam-
ple, the thought that lying undermines the communicative role of  assertion with the fact that we lie often and fla-
grantly. 
 See Scanlon’s discussion of  the Profligate Pal (1990). His defense against this case relies on my actions violating a 8
norm of  gratitude. But although I may violate such a norm in not repaying you, I surely also wrong you by breaking 
my promise. See Southwood and Friedrich (2009) for further discussion. 
 This resembles the famous objection that rule consequentialism inevitably collapses back into act consequentialism 9
(Lyons 1965). Nothing so strong is necessary here though. All we need is that utility maximizing systems of  prom-
issory rules will involve many exceptions. 
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ognizable and obviously harmless type of  promise-breaking.  Finally, even if  you have been 10
ceded normative authority, it’s hard to say why I have a reason to repay you; you simply will not 
invoke the authority I have ceded (3). That my action would defy your uninvoked and uninterest-
ed authority is not, by itself, indicative of  any reason to not perform it. In what sense do you 
have an interest in my promise being kept?  
 It might be worried that these promises are only promises in a by-courtesy sense. And I 
grant that for some promissory conventions such promises don’t really count. In other prom-
issory conventions, including the one I implicitly subscribe to, these count as promises and we 
have reasons, intuitively, to keep them. For those of  us subscribing to such conventions, promise 
breaking in these circumstances is still generally wrong; that there is a reason for me to keep my 
promise even when there is no expectation that I will and no sanction which will be imposed 
when I don’t.  As I suggested above, it is important that the general explanation of  the norma11 -
tive force of  promises is independent of  the particulars of  this or that promissory convention; it 
is a mark significantly in favor of  a view if  it is able to do this, as (1-4) cannot. 
 In many contexts, such promises do not create expectations of  fulfillment, but I would 
hesitate to say that they carried no normative authority.  And, in fatigued enough circumstances, 12
there is roughly no chance that we will invoke our normative authority against, say, politicians, 
bosses, or parents, even if  they have ceded it to us. Perhaps I sometimes have an interest in them 
keeping their promises—but surely not always. Yet there is a lingering sense in which the politi-
cian, boss, or parent had a reason to keep the promise merely in virtue of  the fact that they had 
made it. Failure to see this seems to me to be indicative of  failing to distinguish between being 
blameworthy for breaking such promises and having reasons to keep them. 
 If  we accept that we have reasons to keep our promises in both types of  case sketched 
above, then none of  the mentioned views will suffice. Or, anyways, views that can capture this 
intuition are to be preferred. Our abductive argument in favor of  quasi-conventionalism can be 
 Of  course, it could perhaps be argued that the optimific set of  rules involves rules without exceptions because 10
they are, say, easier to follow. This also seems implausible; it’s not as if  we have trouble applying our actual rules 
which have multiple and often very particularistic exceptions. At best, the rule-consequentialist faces an additional 
explanatory burden here. Thanks to a reviewer for discussion. 
 Note that since my argument is abductive, even if  these don’t count as legitimate promises—which, of  course, 11
they do—there are still very good reasons to prefer a quasi-conventionalist account. Note also that the quasi-con-
ventionalist can not only explain why these count as legitimate promises (for many of  us), she can also explain why 
they don’t for others. If  they don’t count, then there are local conventional conditions on promissory uptake or 
happiness that exclude these cases from counting as situations in which we can successfully promise. 
 David Owens’s early work accounts for these sorts of  cases in terms of  bare wronging, explained in terms of  “non-12
instrumental value in its making sense for your deliberations to be shaped by promises and other 
obligations.” (Owens 2006)  This strikes me as less promising than the quasi-conventionalist story I tell; for one 
thing, it is hard to explain in a compelling way how such value can be non-instrumental.
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strengthened by noting another feature of  promising that (1) and (4) neglect—the particularity of  
promissory reasons.  
1.2 Particularity of  Promissory Reasons 
There is something personal about someone breaking a promise to us. It is not just that they 
have offended against the community of  promise makers and keepers; it is not even that they 
have offended against everyone or the world by making it a bit worse off.  They have offended 
us. Kolodny and Wallace (2003) put the point well: 
 … the practice view cannot account for our conviction that the wrongness of  breaking 
 promises is to be explained by reference to the reasons that the promisee in particular  
 would have to object to the promiser's failure to perform. (emphasis mine) 
Everyone has reasons to object to someone breaking a promise when the wrongness of  promise 
breaking is understood in Rawls’ or Hooker’s terms.  But this is not how we understand the 13
wrong of  promise breaking. We think that there are special reasons to keep our promises and that 
claims against me as a promise-breaker are local; they are not reasons for everyone to ensure my 
promise is kept or claims that others can make.  A theory that neglected this feature of  our rea14 -
sons to keep our promises would be unacceptably revisionary. This is not to say that there aren’t 
sometimes reasons for me to make you keep your promise.  Often there will be. And it is not to 
say that others never have any claim against me for breaking my promise to you. Often they do. 
But this isn’t sufficient to assuage our intuition that I have a special reason to keep my promise to 
you and that when I don’t, you have a special claim against me. 
 Quasi-conventionalist accounts have little trouble explaining why the claim against the 
promise-breaker is local to the promisee; (social) rules of  the practice set the conditions under 
which and, more importantly, who may impose or prescind from imposing the sanction. Typically, 
for most promises, this is the promisee. In some cases, others have a right to sanction as well, 
but this right is often lesser and if  the promisee lets the offender off  the hook, others are 
blocked from sanctioning. And quasi-conventionalism directly captures the sense in which I have 
 Their remark is, of  course, directed at Scanlon. Nevertheless, the point applies broadly. Hooker might object that 13
it maximizes utility to have objections be limited to only the victim of  a promise-breaking, but why would this be 
true? Wouldn't it be more useful overall to have the entire society able to criticize a promise-breaker?
 One special case here is the witnessed vow—think of  marriage vows. In such cases, a far larger group of  people 14
share the claim against a promise breaker. I set oaths, vows, and the like aside for simplicity here. 
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a special reason to keep my promise to you. I care about my culpability. In particular, I care about 
my culpability to you,  since typically you are the one who has a claim about me I care about.  15 16
 Accounts like (1) and (4) tend to miss this point; the reason they provide is a reason for 
everyone to get me keep my promise as well.  If  this affects me more than others, it’s because 17
I’m typically in the best position to make myself  keep my promise. There are such general rea-
sons, of  course, but they do not suffice to explain the particular reason I have to keep my prom-
ise, which generate merely by promising. This simply is not a reason available to others. 
 So, the correct view will imply that legitimate promises, in any normal case, give rise to 
reasons to keep them and, moreover, that these reasons are local to us in the sense that they are 
our reasons, not reasons available for everyone or, even, everyone who is part of  the promissory 
convention. Again, this is not to deny that there are cases when promises or apparent promises 
do not give rise to reasons.  But these cases should be relatively rare and have to do with condi18 -
tions for a legitimate promise to not come off  or, in Austin’s nice phrase, be unhappy. 
1.3 Extrinsic Reasons to Keep Promises and Further Benefits  
We also want to allow that there are other extrinsic reasons to keep our promises; reasons over 
and above the special reasons which arise from the mere fact that we have promised. In my view, 
much of  the confusion that has arisen about promising comes from the fact that there are often 
many different reasons to keep our promises. Some are extrinsic—the expectation that we will 
perform the promise (Scanlon) or more general moral concerns (Hooker and others)—and some 
are intrinsic—such as promissory reasons. As the cases above show, extrinsic reasons can be re-
 See below for more discussion of  the distinction between desires to avoid being blame-culpable and desires to 15
avoid being blame-culpable to you in particular. It is plausible that in the majority of  cases, both are present. 
 Simple modifications of  the view are possible which do even better at capturing this feature. We could complicate 16
the picture by introducing a relative notion of  blame-liability—relativized to the permitted sanctioners—and claim 
that our reason to not break our promises stems from our desire to not be blame-liable to them. A fully developed 
version of  this view needs to accommodate the point that our desires are often a desire to not be blameworthy to you 
for doing this or that. This means that I will typically have more reason to keep my promise to my mother or my best 
friend than I do to a random person. And I will perhaps have more reason to keep my promise to co-sign a loan 
than I do to meet you for lunch—‘perhaps’ since extrinsic reasons also matter here. But this strikes me as a virtue of  
my account—I simply do have more reason to keep my promises to those I tremble at being blame-liable to. I still 
need a desire that holds for any case. But it seems plausible to me that we typically have a generic desire to not be 
blame-liable to anyone for anything, and thereby a generic reason to keep our promise to anyone for doing anything. 
This is plausible—see the discussion below—but fully justifying it will require further work. Thanks to Agnes 
Callard for pushing me on this point. 
 Kolodny and Wallace op cit show that Scanlon’s account (2) likewise has trouble meeting this constraint.  17
 Cases of  coercion, cases of  failures of  information, and suchlike may cancel our reasons to keep our promises. 18
Or, perhaps, such “promises” do not count as promises at all. Nothing turns on which we say.
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moved without removing the intrinsic reasons to keep our promises.  The temptation to place 19
all the normative force on the extrinsic reasons is strong, but it gives an inadequate picture of  
the normative contours of  promising.  One tempting diagnosis of  the mistake common to all 20
these views is that they conflate extrinsic reasons for certain promissory conventions and conse-
quences thereof  with intrinsic reasons arising, at least partially, from the convention itself. This is 
like arguing that en passant is illegitimate in chess because chess without en passant would be a 
more elegant game. Focusing on extrinsic reasons yields another benefit. Consider:  
  Conflicting Promises I promise to pick you up from the airport and I also  
  promise to meet my friend for coffee to discuss some tragedy in their life. I have 
  no antecedent reason to believe that there will be any problem keeping both.  
  Your plane gets delayed a tremendously long time due to an unpronouncable vol
  cano exploding, making it impossible for me to fulfill both promises. I had no 
  reason to expect that this would happen. You, savvy traveler, will have relatively 
  few problems finding your way to your hotel, but my other friend is quite dis- 
  traught. I cannot ask your permission to break the promise; there is not enough 
  time. I text you that I will not be picking you up and comfort my friend. 
In this case, I want to say that (a) I have a reason to keep both promises—in fact, I think I am 
promissorily obliged, at least in the sense of  the formal ought attached to our promissory conven-
tions, to keep both promises, (b) I have an extrinsic moral reason to break and keep the promises 
I did, and (c) given that I had to break at least one promise and I broke the obviously less impor-
tant promise, it wouldn’t be cricket to blame me, though it would be within your rights to do so. 
So we have a nice case of  conflict between moral reasons and promissory reasons. Assimilating the 
sort of  reasons generated by our promises to moral reasons results in trouble capturing the lin-
gering feeling that something is less than ideal about my actions. This is better captured by keep-
ing my reasons to keep my promises separated from my reasons to do what is right.  
 Quasi-conventionalism promises an elegant solution to this troubling problem. How can 
it be that I have done the best thing I could (morally), yet nevertheless have done something 
wrong? It would be wrong, morally, to blame me for acting this way if  I am not in any significant 
 Liberto (this volume) is sensitive to this point, but she posits a flat ambiguity in the normative force of  promis19 -
ing—sometimes promises give rise to expectation-based-obligations, sometimes they give rise to normative-authori-
ty-based obligations, etc. But in addition to the positing of  an unnecessary ambiguity, this view runs into a rather 
difficult problem. How should we know which obligation we incur by making a promise? Liberto suggests that we 
can individuate by focusing on what counts as breaking the promise, but this just shifts the bump in the rug. If  what 
counts as a promise breaking of  the promise made is sourced in the speech act performed by the promisee, we need 
an ambiguity account of  a seemingly unified type of  speech act. One wonders why we should call both types of  
speech act promises at all. If  the act is unified, but the obligation varied, then it is a mystery how the act could give 
rise to the obligation all by itself, as it seems to. Liberto’s view, in spite of  its ecumenical virtues, is too costly.
 There is also the typical temptation here to confuse reasons to have a practice with reasons internal to the practice. There 20
are many moral and prudential reasons to propagate a promissory convention, but these do not yield a reason for 
me to keep my particular promise since, as has been noted here and many times elsewhere, breaking my particular 
promise does not undermine the socially valuable promissory practice. See Maguire and Woods (Unpublished).
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sense culpable for making inconsistent promises. The answer is that I have done something for 
which I can be blamed, by promissory lights, and hence have done something wrong, by prom-
issory lights. But I am immune to moral blame. If  our promissory reasons are weighty, then we 
get even closer to explaining my sense that there is something seriously wrong with my breaking 
a promise, even when I am morally blameless for so doing, as in the above case.  An exactly 21
similar move can be made with respect to immoral promises—when I promise to kill my victim 
with your favorite knife, I go against my promissory reasons by killing them with a corkscrew, 
though I should morally have not killed them at all.  22
 Summing up, we have found a number of  desiderata for our account of  promising.  
  (A) It should account for how promising nearly always gives rise to reasons.
  (B) It should explain the particularity of  promissory reasons. 
  (C) It should explain, in a natural way, how we can have moral, prudential, 
   political, etc. reasons as well as promissory reasons to keep our promises.
  
The best approach to satisfying (A-C) identifies a feature of  the conventional practice of  
promising which (a) places the promise-maker in a unique position, (b) gives a unified picture of  
promissory reasons without undermining the extrinsic reasons to keep our promises, and (c) 
holds even in the cases of  promising sketched above. We can then use this feature to explain why 
we have reasons to keep our promises, even though the feature I will identify as doing this work 
doesn’t by itself generate reasons to perform a promise. The feature I have in mind is blame-liability. 
2. The Positive Proposal — Blame-liability, Blameworthiness, and Blame 
Consider the Drones, a famous, yet fictional, gentleman’s club in London. The Drones have a 
number of  by-laws, including the rule that one must attempt to steal a policeman’s helmet when-
ever the opportunity presents itself. Failure to do so has the sanction of  having the entire club 
throw dinner rolls at the offender. Chester Fottheringly-Bantam, a veteran member, sees a clear 
 Of  course, we would still have to give an account of  how promissory reasons conflict and of  how we can be 21
wrong in breaking a promise even when we could not but do so. The theorist who accepts moral dilemmas might 
not find these arguments compelling. Well and good, but moral dilemmas are puzzling! My account of  the prom-
issory case of  a moral dilemma captures the important sense attached to them while dissolving the puzzle.
 An even more radical move is to suggest that the picture I have sketched for the reasons arising from promises 22
holds mutatis mutandis for reasons arising from morality. If  morality is largely conventional, then we need to ask the 
question of  why we ought to be moral. The best such reason I can think of  is that we generally care about being 
moral or, at least, to not violate moral rules. If  this is right, then it is to be expected that our promissory conven-
tions can conflict with our moral conventions, which is not to say that there aren’t moral rules about keeping 
promises. There often are—think Kantian-flavored positions—but there sometimes are not—compare act-conse-
quentialist pictures. One thing the consequentialist picture seems to get intuitively wrong is that there’s a non-nego-
tiable push of  some type to keep our promises. One thing the Kantian picture gets wrong is that there is often a 
non-negotiable moral push to break them. Separating these two practices splits these problems nicely—and this 
recipe can be applied to other puzzling cases of  normative conflict.
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attempt to steal a policeman’s helmet, worries about the consequences because of  his fledgling 
career as a barrister, and consequently fails to attempt to steal it. Chester is pelted with dinner 
rolls at the next club dinner. Here we have a sanction justly imposed.  
 But now consider Boffy Slantingwood, a neophyte Drone. An opportunity to steal a po-
liceman’s helmet presents itself; Boffy, naif  that he is, fails to recognize the opportunity; and then 
a discussion ensues prior to the next dinner about whether to pelt Boffy with dinner rolls. It is 
decided that Boffy is new and inexperienced enough that his violation of  the by-law isn’t really 
deserving of  the sanction. The hardline members of  the Drones insist to a man that Boffy is 
liable for the offense and they shouldn’t make special exception for new members, especially 
since they pelted poor Chester just last week. Chester, of  course, agrees with this. The more re-
laxed members of  the Drones agree that Boffy is liable and concede that if  they were to pelt 
Boffy with dinner rolls, no one could really complain. Yet they point out that (a) the threat of  
being so pelted is probably sufficient and (b) they’re short on dinner rolls. At the next dinner, the 
members rise to pelt Boffy, but at the last minute they drop their bready missiles and sternly 
warn Boffy that he will not be so lucky next time. 
 In the second case, what we have is a case of  sanction-liability, but without the imposition 
of  the sanction or even sanction-worthiness. Boffy has violated the rules of  the Drones club and 
it is thus within their purview to pelt him with dinner rolls. But note that the fact that it is in 
their purview to do so does not by itself  imply that they must or that it would be reasonable to 
do so. They have discretion about the imposition of  the sanction. There were good reasons to 
not pelt him, but, if  they were to pelt him, he would have little recourse. He could argue that 
they shouldn’t since he was new; but this isn’t to say that they weren’t within their rights to do so, 
just that doing so was unkind or unnecessarily by the book. We could go into some detail about 
why they had good reasons to not impose the sanction in this case—lack of  other dinner rolls, 
that Boffy wasn’t clearly not an irreverent buffoon (the quality that the helmet rule is meant to 
cultivate), etc. But it is sufficient for our purposes to note the distinction between being open to 
sanction, being sanction worthy, and the sanction being imposed. Between, that is, being-pelted-
with-dinner-rolls-liable, being-pelted-with-dinner-rolls-worthy, and being pelted. 
 For another nice example of  sanction-liability, consider the law. Someone can be open to 
legal sanction but imposition of  the sanction would be unreasonable. It is by no means obvious 
that good legal systems will always give judges no discretion in imposition of  sanction. There is 
thus a distinction between being legal-sanction-liable and being actually sanctioned, even in the 
case where the legal system is functioning correctly. There is also a corresponding difference be-
tween it being reasonable or good to impose a sanction and it being open to you qua judge to do so. If  
we imagine the purpose of  the law is to maintain order and reduce harm, and that recognition of  
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this is part of  participating in the practice of  executing the law, then imposing sanctions for 
crimes where the impact on the citizenry is low, when doing so is likely to provoke civil unrest, is 
bad and unreasonable, even though it is in the purview of  the law to do so. 
 The case of  the law is instructive in another fashion. There are many ways for a legal 
sanction to be good or reasonable. One clear way, as just mentioned, is for the sanction to fit 
with the purpose of  the law—if  the purpose of  the sanction is to deter others from breaking the 
law—as in the specious justification of  the death penalty—then it is reasonable to impose the 
sanction when it deters. And permissible even when it does not, at least as far as the law goes.  
 Sometimes the reasons are extrinsic to the practice. When keeping a promise would re-
sult in a moral tragedy, there are tremendous moral reasons to avoid keeping the promise. It is 
thus (morally) unreasonable to blame someone for breaking the promise in that circumstance. 
And sometimes it is a balance of  the two. Even if  the purpose of  a prescriptive grammatical rule 
is to prevent confusion, then there still may be a small reason to cite the mistake in contexts 
where it will cause no confusion—we should not develop bad habits. But posh supermarkets 
which have ‘10 items or fewer’ signs are simply obnoxious as the social reasons to speak with the 
vulgar are far more important than a constant grammatical peccadillo. 
 So, ultimately, we have a threefold distinction between the imposition of  sanctions, it be-
ing good or reasonable to impose sanctions—subdivided between intrinsic aims and extrinsic 
aims—and being open to sanction. Certain conventional practices will collapse the first and the 
third. In certain legal systems, for certain crimes, if  you are open to legal sanction, the court will 
have little to no discretion in whether to punish you.  But not always. What counts as good or 23
reasonable with respect to imposing sanctions may be local to the convention, but it often is not. 
Reasonableness arises here from other domains—morality, for example—and from the purpose 
of  the practice in the first place. But liability for legal and promissory sanction is completely local, 
being entirely set by the rules and laws of  the practices in question. 
 I take promissory conventions, like club rules and legal conventions, to be constituted by 
sets of  rules and corresponding sanctions which can be imposed. Perhaps some conventions are 
not so constituted, but the cases under consideration certainly seem to be. A detailed discussion 
of  the nature of  conventions would take us afield, so let me set out briefly what I take to charac-
terize the sort of  conventions at issue. They are a trio of  rules, corresponding sanctions, and 
(sometimes) an internal purpose that generates a notion of  reasonableness in imposing sanc-
tions, as in the above Drones case. Some of  these rules set the condition of  who may impose or 
lift the sanction when appropriate (rules of  adjudication), as is most important for the case of  
  Three strike laws are a good example. Judges often actually have the most discretion with respect to the amount 23
of  sanction, but sometimes their hands are tied even here—compare mandatory minimums in American drug law. 
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promising, along with conditions for introducing new by-laws (rules of  change) and deciding 
whether a formal rule has been broken, as in the case of  the Drones. These rules tend to be in-
ternalized into our practice of  recognizing certain individuals as having this authority—and they 
have this authority because we accord it to them and accept that they have it. They are, in the 
Hart’s sense, social rules.  
 Rules may be explicit or implicit, but the conditions for breaking them must be roughly 
clear enough to allow a participant to the convention to judge, generally, whether or not the rule 
has been violated. The rules may be laid down in explicit form with all possible cases considered 
or defined elsewhere (‘dress is white tie’), or they may have a more vague and particularistic feel 
(‘dress is business casual’). All that is really necessary is that rules be such that either there is a 
determinate property of  liability for sanction that can be determined by participants to the con-
vention or there is a rule governing who may decide whether someone is sanction-liable.  Note, 24
–liable, not –worthy.  
 Blame-liability is exactly the sort of  property we need to explain the normativity of  
promising. It is present in every case of  promise-breaking, it is intrinsic to the promising conven-
tion itself, and it is plausibly something we have reason to want to avoid. For example, cases like 
deathbed promise and no expectation promise are outliers where the ordinary extrinsic reasons 
do not obtain, and in which the promise-breaker is not clearly blameworthy for doing so, yet we 
feel compelled to say that there is still a reason to keep our promise. We thus need a feature that 
is present in both cases in our explanation of  our reasons in this case. But blame-liability is 
present in both cases. Even though I will not be blamed in either case by the promisee (because 
they do not care or are not alive), and am perhaps not even blameworthy (watering is a pain and 
no one cares about the money), I am still liable for blame.  And, if  liability to blame for promise 25
breaking is sufficient to generate a reason for me to keep my promise, then we have reason to 
keep our promises even in the outlier cases I sketched above. But is liability for blame enough? 
 For a nice recent discussion of  conventions which attempts to accommodate Lewisian conventions as well, see 24
(Marmour 2009). The tradition of  taking promissory conventions to be constituted by constitutive rules dates to 
Rawls’s early discussion of  rules (Rawls 1955). Note that there does not seem to be a rule of  recognition, in Hart’s 
sense, for promissory conventions. Well and good, unlike the law, it is unclear that we need to have a validating rule 
such as the rule of  recognition on top of  rules of  change and adjudication. This topic gets more messy (and more 
interesting) in the context of  full-bore quasi-conventionalism; I hope thus to address it elsewhere.
 This is not to say that in ordinary such cases, I will never be blamed by others. Bystander members of  the prom25 -
issory convention, at least in many cases, can sometimes blame (morally, prudentially, and sometimes promissorily) 
for breaking my promise to someone. 
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2.1 From Liability for Blame to Reasons to Keep our Promises 
 The key to the plausibility of  the quasi-conventionalist story is a claim about typical hu-
man desires. It is that, typically, rational creatures care about being liable for blame.  Note that 26
this is not the claim that we do not like getting blamed; it is rather the claim that we do not like 
being liable for blame. Put aside for now the question of  whether or not this is true. If  it is true, 
then if  our desires give rise to desire-based reasons and if  we have instrumental reasons to carry 
out actions that realize our desires, we have a pro tanto reason to not break our promises. What 
we need for this linking claim to go through is that if  we want it not to be the case that A and 
doing X will bring about A, then we have a pro tanto reason to avoid X-ing. This seems to be a 
very plausible minimal claim about the desire-based reasons.  27
 If  one accepts this connection between desires and reasons, given the claim that we care 
about being blame-liable, and given that in all typical cases of  promises, breaking them implies 
the breaker is liable for blame, we have reasons to keep our promises in such cases. If  I have 
made a legitimate promise, then I will be blame-liable if  I break it. I do not want to be blame-
liable, so I have a pro tanto reason to avoid breaking my promise. How strong a pro tanto rea-
son? This will depend on the strength of  my desire to avoid being blame-liable. Ideally, it should 
be a strong desire, but there is no guarantee of  this. But, I think, this is not much of  a problem. 
So long as we typically have a strong desire to avoid being blame-liable, we will get a correspond-
ingly strong reason to avoid breaking our promise. I do not, however, claim here that our prom-
issory reasons to keep our promises are strong, even though I think it’s true. My purpose is to 
construct scaffolding, not yet to strut it.   
 The desires I am focusing on here are generic—they are desires to not be blame-liable 
[to anyone in particular for anything in particular], not a desire to not be blame-liable [to Mark 
FOR sending my paper late] or to not be blame-liable [to humanity FOR buying a selfie-stick]. 
That such generic desires exist is antecedently plausible—consider the analogous case of  desires 
for food. The other sort of  particularized reasons exist, of  course. We may want to eat, but not 
want to eat the meal placed in front of  us. Likewise, I think, we might want to not be blame-li-
able, but, in fact, not care a whit about being blame-liable to Joe for not showing up for lunch. 
 I mean the notion of  desire here to be fairly broad notion—something like an end or a psychological state with a 26
world-to-mind direction of  fit. 
 Note two things. First, there are resources for downplaying worries about such humean accounts (Schroeder 27
2007), including a way to defend the idea that some of  our reasons swim under the veil of  unmentionability since 
they are too minimal to be mentioned in the context of  explicit practical reasoning. Second, it is possible to swap 
out a non-humean account of  desire-based reasons and run the same argument—this especially since my desire to 
not be blame-liable is nothing like a desire to chug a bucket of  paint.
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Perhaps Joe broke his promise to me last week, so I don’t feel particularly worried about him 
blaming me.  Is this a problem with my account?  28
 No; in fact, it is a benefit of  it. I, presumably, have less reason on balance to keep my 
promise to Joe than I do to my saintly mother who has never violated a commitment to me. My 
account captures this nicely since my on balance reasons to keep my promise to Joe are less 
weighty. Note, though, that this does not show that I am not blame-liable to Joe for breaking my 
promise; I am. I am simply not, perhaps, blameworthy for breaking this promise and my reasons to 
keep it, though existent, are weaker than they would otherwise be. The interaction of  particular 
and generic desires thus allows a more nuanced treatment of  our practical judgments.  29
 That generic and particular reasons interact in this way can be made additionally plausible 
by noting that when we don’t seem to care about being blame-liable to another human being—
which I think is rarer than it might seem—this has often to do with cases where we would not be 
blameworthy for breaking our promise to them because they have wronged us in some way. Giv-
en that Joe has just broken his promise to me, it would be unjust for him to blame me for break-
ing mine to him; I am, perhaps, not blameworthy for breaking this promise (given other details 
easily spelled out.) I might then not care about being blame-liable to him for breaking mine; I 
have an easy and conventionally acceptable defense of  my actions to him—two wrongs do, some-
times, make an okay, at least to the wrongdoer—but I have no defense to someone else for 
breaking my promise to Joe—I ought to be better than him. The most plausible story about this 
seems to me to be that I have a generic desire to avoid being a promise-breaker (to avoid being 
blame-liable), no particular desire to avoid being blame-liable to him for breaking my promise, 
but a desire, perhaps, to avoid being blame-liable to another for breaking my promise to Joe.  
 We have identified a feature of  promise-breaking that is present in all cases of  happy 
promising; this means that our worrisome cases provide no counterexample to us having reasons 
to keep our promises so long as we care to avoid blame-liability. Put slightly differently, this 
 Note that much of  what I say could be maintained even if we do not possess these generic desires, as long as, for 28
arbitrary people and actions, we typically possess the particularized desires. I think this is also very plausible—think-
ing otherwise seems to me to, once again, conflate the difference between being blameworthy and blame-liable for 
violating a commitment—but I won’t argue for it here since I think the posit of  generic desires makes for a more 
plausible and interesting account. 
 Note that we might worry that the generic desire is composed of  particular desires (a worry like this is suggested by 29
a reviewer), but consider again hunger and the interaction of  my strong desire for food and repulsion at the particu-
lar food in front of  me. These are seemingly distinct desires interacting with each other. Note also the contents of  
the generic desire are aimed at possessing a certain property—being blame-liable— whereas the contents of  the 
particular desires are aimed at ways in which we might possess this property—being blame-liable to a for X-ing. It 
seems fairly clear that we can and frequently do, perhaps with a bit of  irrationality, want to be some way, but not 
want to be any of  the ways of  being that way; even more clear is that we can and frequently do want to be some way 
without wanting to be that way in some particular way. In such cases, I hold that the desires weigh against each oth-
er; the one does not eliminate or obscure the other. So, in particular, they both produce reasons. 
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means that there is no situation in which we, if  we are humanly-typical, do not have reasons to 
keep our promises, unlike the alternative conventionalist views mooted above. But it also means 
that if  we are not humanly-typical—if  we do not care about being blame-liable—we have no 
reason. It is to this problem that we now turn.  
2.2 Worries for Quasi-Conventionalism about Promising 
 The obvious problem with this account is that it makes our reasons to keep our promises 
contingent on our desires. What do we say about the person who simply does not care about be-
ing blame-liable? One simple response to this, first articulated by Philippa Foot, is simply to say 
that such people are odd.  We do care about being blame-liable. People who don’t care about 30
such things are odd and we should not worry overly much about their presence. For them, per-
haps there is no reason to keep a promise, outside of  extrinsic reasons and fear of  sanction, but 
what of  it? Most of  us are not like that and the existence of  a few such people or even their pos-
sibility will not make useful social conventions like that of  promising implode.  31
 But something more can actually be said, I think, about the fact that we typically care. 
Consider someone who is unsporting. The soccer player who takes a dive at any opportunity or 
the bridge player who sneaks a peek at the opponents’s cards when they’re not looking. Such 
things do not invalidate the game, though they generate liability to sanction.  Suppose such 32
players care about the sanction, but not the liability for sanction. Intuitively, there is something 
wrong with them. They’ve done something wrong. But why? The most plausible explanation is 
that we think that there’s something wrong with breaking the rules or implicit norms in these 
contexts, even if  we’re not caught, even if  we’re not actually in danger of  sanction. Of  course, where we 
think that there’s something wrong with doing something, we typically desire to not do it.  We 33
don’t want to be the unsporting card player or the dive-taking soccer player.  34
 See her unfortunately recanted-upon (Foot 1972). I develop this line of  response elsewhere.30
 In fact, I view the fact that such people do not have promissory reasons to keep their promises (they may have 31
prudential reasons, of  course!) as a feature, not a bug, for reasons much like those laid out in (Manne 2014). A de-
tailed discussion would take us afield here, but I address the issue in other work (Woods Manuscript). 
 Sometimes these are actually not rule-governed in the sense of  being explicitly forbidden by the rules. This is a 32
reason to go with blame-liability instead of  simply the property of  not breaking the rules, More on this below. 
 This desire is potentially entangled with the view that someone who does such a thing, including ourselves, is to 33
be badly regarded. This causes no problem for my point; it is a potential explanation of  the grounds of  our desire to 
avoid blame-liability. 
 Note that this concerns the typical interactions of  a pair of  psychological states, nothing more. I make no claim 34
(here!) about the rationality or irrationality of  thinking something wrong yet not wanting to do it. 
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 That’s one further thing that can be said. Here’s another. Consider the difference be-
tween a voluntary promise and a voluntary response to a threat—say, deciding to pay a black-
mailer. When I promise, I voluntarily undertake to do something and do so on threat of  sanc-
tion. When I cave to threats, I undertake to do something on threat of  something bad happening 
to me. Of  course, the promissory sanction is regulated by a set of  rules and the threat typically 
not, but we can fix this up easily enough. Consider a ruling body that has imposed their will on a 
people by force and imposed an extraordinarily rigid set of  “sanctions” on their governed. Intu-
itively, I have more of  a reason to obey my promise than I do to obey the dictates of  such a gov-
erning body. Why? Presumably, it is because I care about being open to sanction for promise 
breaking—I view such a sanction as legitimate.  Whereas I do not care about being open to 35
sanction from the governing body—just whether I’ll be sanctioned and the likelihood thereof.  36
 For a final reason, consider the distinction between two sorts of  reasons to obey laws. In 
Boston, it is against the law to jaywalk. Nevertheless, Bostonians jaywalk flagrantly. The only 
possible reason to not do so is the almost unimaginable threat of  actually getting a ticket. When, 
as very occasionally happens, someone gets ticketed, we view it as a great injustice, though one 
that was within the (legal) rights of  the cop to create. This is a case where there is no legal reason 
to not jaywalk except for how much we care about the sanction and the likelihood of  the sanc-
tion being imposed. Likewise where the sanction is likely to be imposed, but where we view the 
sanction as unjust; think of  marijuana laws or public drinking laws.  But in other cases, where 37
there is almost no threat of  sanction, we nevertheless think that we have a reason to obey the 
law. Voting laws are somewhat like this; as are tax laws. Even though sanction is rarely if  ever 
imposed, we nevertheless think that we have a reason to obey these laws. Even when we think 
that the benefit of  us actually obeying the law is roughly nil—think of  voting in a relentlessly 
blue state. Why? Again, I want to suggest that we care about being in violation of  these laws.  
 Again, note that this is a claim about the interactions of  certain psychological states, nothing more. The reader 35
might incline to the view that it is sufficient to generate a reason that we recognize a certain practice as legitimate; 
this is very similar, again, to Hart’s views about the normativity of  the law. But I find this entirely mysterious. Why is 
it sufficient that we recognize that someone has legitimate authority over us for us to have a reason to obey such 
authority? My explanation is clear—because we typically also care about not trampling legitimate authority or author-
ity we have internalized. The alternative view seems to me to either need to accept this connection as brute—unde-
sirable—or explain why we have such reasons—unpromising. I favor my style of  explanation.
 Clearly this is related to the fact that I have voluntarily undertaken the threat of  sanction in the promise case, but 36
not in the governing body case. But this is not sufficient as I may have very good reasons to voluntarily undertake 
subjugation by a despotic government, yet the point still holds. 
 You might worry here that the important part is us not being blameworthy here. But we might be blameworthy to 37
jaywalk—jaywalking is tremendously dangerous, so we have extrinsic prudential reason to not jaywalk and can be 
blamed for doing so.
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 This is admittedly very impressionistic, but I think the point is a solid one. There is sim-
ply a difference between recognizing a practice and its sanctions as legitimate and caring only 
about the sanction that might be imposed. When we recognize a practice and its sanctioning 
practice as legitimate, we care to not violate it and we go to great lengths to defend ourselves 
from our failures to comply—think about someone who has not voted in an election trying to 
justify themselves against someone who claims they have a duty to do so.  When we accept and 
internalize a set of  norms, we take following these norms seriously.  38
 You might think that there really are two distinct properties here. One is the property of  
having violated a rule or implicit norm. The other is the property of  being liable for sanction 
based on your violation of  a rule. We might care about one, but not the other. But I think these 
run close together, especially in the case of  something like promising where the sanction is 
something like blame and resentment for violation of  the rules. The content of  the blame is that 
we broke the rules, in a way that is not generally acceptable. When the sanction is tied so closely 
to the fact that you have violated the rule, then there really is very little gap between caring about 
being sanction-liable and being in violation of  the rule.  
 And in cases where they come apart, we may care or not about violating the rule—yet we 
nearly always care about being blame-liable. To care for obeying the rules in the absence of  car-
ing about being blame-liable would be incredibly rule-fetishistic—in the sense rightly disparaged in 
(Smith, 1994).  We are not typically like this. But to care about being blame-liable without caring 
about the rules strikes me as more reasonable. It is more or less the attitude sensible folks take 
towards ordinary etiquette.  Note that if  I had to abandon the notion of  blame-liability in favor 39
of, or even add in, caring about simple rule-breaking as a source of  reasons (we can be fetishistic, 
after all), my account would not totter—as long as there is, as there obviously is, a distinction 
 Maybe the reader will worry that we often have reason to change our norms. Perhaps, but that is not relevant. 38
Etiquette norms have pull long after we recognize how arbitrary and, quite frankly, silly many of  their dictates are. 
Part of  the problem is that if  we do not uniformly change our practice, then we might be accepting a more stringent 
set of  requirements than we are inclined to enforce. And this seems unfair. So there is sometimes also extrinsic rea-
sons to stick with a non-ideal set of  norms. Note that these are reasons for our practice to be the way it is, not prac-
tice-internal reasons arising from what we care about. Even if  there are reasons for us to change our practice, that 
has little relevance to the reasons arising from our desires to be good practitioners. All it means is that these reasons 
might be outweighed. But it by no means implies that we have no reason to obey the rules of  our current promissory 
practice. Just as the fact that it would be better to eradicate norms of  etiquette which demand excessive politeness 
outweighs, but does not undermine, our etiquette-internal reasons to be overly polite.
 Note that a striking example of  this is when someone is not in a position to blame us through rule-regulated be39 -
havior—perhaps they have lost their status as a blame-leveler due to some sin. Typically in such cases, we lose much 
of  our reason to avoid breaking the rules as we lose blame-liability. See also the discussion above of  cases where we 
lose blameworthiness but not blame-liability. The particulars will depend on the particular contours of  our promissory 
conventions. 
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between breaking a rule and being blameworthy for breaking the rule. But I think blame-liability 
better captures what we typically care about.  
 Finally, note that we need to distinguish between caring about being blame-liable and car-
ing about being blameworthy. It is prima facie plausible that we care even more about being 
blameworthy than we do about being blame-liable. But this is insufficient to explain our full de-
sires with respect to conformity to a practice and immunity to sanction. We prefer to not be 
blameworthy, but we would also rather be entirely clean of  the possibility of  blame. And this is a 
very natural state. Recent work by (Keupp, Behne, and Rakoczy 2013) shows that young children 
(ages 3 and 5) absorb normative practice so thoroughly that, even in explicitly goal-directed 
tasks, they protest actions that do not perfectly mimic the method they had been shown of  
achieving the goal. That is, they over-imitate in their own behavior and protest non-imitation. 
  I have assumed our desires give rise to reason regardless of  their reasonableness.  If  40
this is right, then we should expect that as we get better at identifying instrumental reasoning, 
such as that involved in goal-directed behaviors, we cease over-imitating, but maintain a concern 
with acting correctly in tasks which are more method-directed, such as moral, promissory, eti-
quette, and game-oriented practices. But we, even on reflection, know quite well that in many 
such cases, we will not be blameworthy in virtue of  not contravening any purpose such practices 
have…yet we regard ourselves as having reason to act correctly. This corresponds nicely with the 
findings of  the study just cited, when the focus was placed on the reactions of  older children.   41
     Importantly, this helps to further explain why we care about sanction-liability, not only sanction-
worthiness. Blameworthiness, as I have sketched it above, depends directly on intrinsic or extrinsic 
aims of  a practice. We are not worthy of  blame merely by contravening a practice. Something fur-
ther needs to be said to justify leveling a reactive attitude like blame at us. But many domains of  
normative concern, though the rules governing them have an extrinsic goal, do not have an obvi-
ous built-in intrinsic goal in the way that shooting a pool ball or, even the law, has a built-in goal. 
It thus very plausible that when it comes to such domains, it is unnatural to care only about be-
 Note again that I could still tell the story I want if  I assumed that our desires needed independent justification in 40
order to generate reasons as, very plausibly, promissory practices are a very valuable part of  our social behavior. I 
prefer not to do this, but my account does not rule it out. 
Of  course, as above, many of  these desires might be directed at people explicitly breaking the rules; perhaps our 41
desires to conform to certain practices is very particularized. It’s difficult to extract the sort of  distinction between 
generic and particular desires given this sort of  experimental data, especially given the authority role of  the experi-
menter. However, my point here is merely to suggest why we nearly always have some desires to avoid being blame-
liable, even perhaps to avoid being blame-liable a for X-ing. The justification of  generic desires would require addi-
tional argument, such as that given above, for the usefulness and antecedent plausibility of  having desires to avoid 
having the general property of  being blame-liable to anyone for anything. Again, note that we can plausibly invoke 
the distinction between blame-liability and blameworthiness to explain difficult cases. Often the reasons we don’t 
seem to care about being blame-liable to someone for something has to do with the unreasonableness of  them blam-
ing me legitimately.  
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havior that serves the point of  the norms governing it. Rather we care about behavior that is in 
conformity with the rules for the practice, encapsulated in liability to sanction.  42
3. Conclusion 
 To summarize the above discussion: If  we care not only about being blamed for breaking 
our promises or even being blameworthy, but also about being liable for such blame and if  our 
desires give rise to reasons, then we have reason to keep our promises, even in outlier cases like 
those I started with. That we do care about being blame-liable, while contingent, is in many ways 
to be expected. Besides the psychological results I cite, being blame-liable is often tightly con-
nected with violating the rules of  a practice that you regard as legitimate; when we regard such 
practices as legitimate, we care not only about being punished for stepping outside of  the rules, 
but also about keeping within the rules themselves. The practice of  promising is exactly a case 
where we typically regard the practice as legitimate, care not only about being blamed, but also 
about being open to being blamed, and this is because we do not want to put ourselves in a posi-
tion where we cannot defend our actions against the accusation that we broke the rules (which is 
in itself  a type of  sanction when we care about breaking them.) 
     If  this is on the right track, then there is serious plausibility to our style of  explanation. We 
can explain the special reasons that attach to promising by exploiting our desires and the fact that 
practices governed by social rules, such as promising, set conditions for being liable for sanctions 
such as blame. Such reasons have the features we want: they arise from just about all cases of  
promising, they make essential reference to our promise breaking (they are reasons for us to avoid 
breaking our promises to you), they allow extrinsic reasons to keep our promises (resulting in a 
more adequate picture of  our reasons to keep our promises as well as dissolving puzzles about 
evil and conflicting promises), the explanation is flexible enough to allow reasonable contextual 
variation in promissory reasons, and they are entirely unmysterious. Quasi-conventionalism 
about promising, I conclude, has quite a bit going for it. More than enough for us to believe it. 
 Barry Maguire and his perceptive class have convinced me that I could recast much of  what I say in terms of  thin 42
blameworthiness incurred simply by breaking a rule and thick blameworthiness incurred by breaking a rule that matters. As 
little turns on how we cast the point, I will continue with my terminology. 
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